# 1NC

## T

#### Our interpretation is that the Affirmative should defend a strategyfor engaging in politics that can be actualized outside of the debate space.

#### Violation- The Affirmative provides no explanation of how (insert affirmative’s action) can be actualized outside of the debate space to engage in politics.

#### Vote neg-

#### The first standard is ground-

#### The defense of concrete actions to promote the Affirmative’s ethics is key to negative ground- debates over method are core negative ground-without a *clear concrete action*- Affirmative’s can defend essentially incontestable arguments such as “racism bad”.

#### Without a defense of a concrete advocacy, the negative is incapable of generating competitive methods with the Affirmative- every position becomes permable.

#### Debates in which both sides have ground are key to effective advocacy skills- contestation is the only way to access the critical reflection and thinking necessary for good advocates.

#### The second standard is armchair activism- Refusal to defend a concrete action to accomplish your goals cedes *both micro and macro politics.*

#### Micropolitics- Spending time engaging in *philosophical roleplaying* trades off with your personal ability to affect change in the world- we passively engage in analysis and critique from the academy, yet consistently do nothing to change these structures.

#### Macro politics- Refusal to defend an action that engages with the nitty-gritty realities of the world cedes the halls of power to the right wing- the power vacuum the Affirmative creates when they refuse concrete organized action furthers the power structures the Aff criticizes- *turning case.*

And they don’t get any offense-

#### You should evaluate the 1AC speech act in a vacuum- if we win that they don’t meet our interpretation than the starting point of their resistance is flawed- don’t buy any new 2AC clarifications.

#### Without an explanation of how their advocacy functions, they have no warrant as for why the judge’s ballot is uniquely necessary to advance their advocacy- if they mean to solve by spreading knowledge, that knowledge has already been spread- the judges ballot doesn’t help, especially when the judges ballot is being input on tabroom.

## Frames

#### ( ) Neoliberal lexicon

#### A -- The Aff deployed terms from that lexicon. It’s irrel if it was intentional OR even a disingenuous deployment that aspired to K neolib. Speech acts grow more potent when such deployments are removed.

Kipnis ‘7

Andrew Kipnis - Senior Fellow and Professor Andrew Kipnis in The Department of Anthropology, The Australian National University – “Neoliberalism reified: suzhi discourse and tropes of neoliberalism in the People's Republic of China” - Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 13,383-400 - #E&F – modified for language that may offend - obtained via J-Stor database.

Another problem is that neoliberal policies, *however defined*, may be sincerely or disingenously pursued. Often enough, powerful *social actors* ~~mouth~~ (deploy) neoliberal slogans or ideology of one form or another in a crass attempt to grab power or exploit others. There may be no intention of actually enacting neoliberal policy or striving for neoliberal goals. This issue should be of crucial interest to those who believe (as the author of this article does not) that neoliberalism is systemic in the contemporary world. If neoliberalism is a systemic 'discourse' (as some governmen-tality theorists would have it), then it reproduces itself by producing 'responsibilized' subject/citizens who re-create neoliberal institutions. From this vantage, disingenuous applications of neoliberal discourse would thus work to undermine neoliberal-ism. But if neoliberalism is an 'ideology' that serves merely to mask the true workings of class domination, then disingenuous applications of neoliberal ideas are central to the reproduction of neoliberalism. In such a case, the actual production of autonomous, responsible citizen/subjects would undermine neoliberalism. Few who write as if neoliberalism were systemic in the contemporary world demonstrate awareness of this contradiction.

#### B --- Here’s the Link

Here’s a long, but certainly not completely exhaustive list

-referring to white trust as a form of corporate consolidation

-debate as a monopoly

-participation in debate being the same as working for a business

-“consumer choice” as referring to judge prefs not consumer driven economics

-“ divest trust from those monopolies that comprise policy debate”

- “whites-only activity in which the only anti-competitive business practices is the Trust white people have”

-“white shareholding” in a context not referring to literal shareholding policy

#### C -- Neolib discourse *creates realities* which re-frame the social violence cited by the Aff. That link turns case … it’s also external offense via neolib’s perpetuation of sexualized, racialized, and socio-economic repression.

#### Della Faille ‘15

Dr. Dimitri DELLA FAILLE (PhD, Sociology) is a professor in International Development and Social Sciences at Université du Québec en Outaouai - “A Sociological Understanding of Neoliberal Discourses of Development” - #E&F - https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02046915/document

This paper will attempt to show that social scientists studying development issues must consider these common ideas with considerable caution. We argue that words are, in fact, actions. And as such, they must be investigated. We contend that an examination of underdevelopment and "developing" societies must go beyond an artificial divide between discourse and action. But also, that it must not limit its definition of discourse to an act of deception. Otherwise, we run the risk of misunderstanding social problems, which is the basis for much social action and collective mobilization in the "developing" world. We will also propose in this paper a number of ways to examine language and discourse that go beyond received ideas. We will attempt to show that they are integral parts of action - whether scholarly, activist, administrative or otherwise - against underdevelopment. In the first place, we will focus most of our explanation on how neoliberal governance and policymaking use language, social representation and discourse to achieve their goals. Using example of neoliberal discourses, we will attempt to show how the main ideologies of the various contemporary development discourses transforms our perception and understanding of development problems. This transformation, we argue, exists both in imposing the use of specific words and in successfully controlling means of communication.

We will begin with a quick presentation of discourse and a definition of neoliberal ideologies. Then, we will demonstrate how discourse analysis could study neoliberal discourses by applying to documents about a natural disaster in the Philippines. After this demonstration, we present other various examples of discourse analysis as it applies to development discourses. Then, we present some of the major approaches and methodologies of discourse analysis. Before concluding, we will present some ethical considerations for the analysis of development discourses.

Words of Caution

A paper about language and discourse would fall short of its goal to draw attention to the use of language if it did not contain at least some form of criticism of usages of the word "development". We argue that calling societies "developing" is actually making a normative statement about the past trajectory, current status and expected future of these societies. Social scientists may contend that political, scientific, ethical or lay statements about development and underdevelopment are in fact "problematizations" of human societies. A problematization is a process by which social relations, practices, rules, institutions, and habits previously established are suddenly viewed as doubtful and problematic (Foucault 2001). The word "development" itself may carry different meanings around the world (Thornton et al. 2012). The understanding and expectations of actions in the name of "development" are conditioned by social representations and interpretations. However, we contend that development discourses are problematizations of the "developing" world because they transform the history of societies of Latin America, Asia, Africa and some parts of Europe into a long story of troubles and failures. They do that in order to justify social transformations and interventions (Escobar 1994). We also contend that they are problematizations because they produce cultural discourses that apply specifically to "developing" countries, and therefore reinforce ideas about the perceived superiority of "developed" countries over the rest of the world (Mohanty 1984).

This paper refuses to hierarchize societies based on perceptions of their economic achievement, their form of political governance or the global recognition of their cultural products. We recognize that discourses about "development" are problematizations, and that perceptions of any social, political or cultural inferiority of these regions, countries or populations must be criticized. We therefore use the term "developing" for some societies, not as a normative statement on regions, countries, and populations viewed as economically, socially, politically or culturally inferior to the "developed world", but rather as an unfortunate shortcut to describe regions and countries in which actors desire to act in the name of "development". There is a wealth of scholarly literature on criticism of the use of the word "development", some of which is evoked further in this paper.

We will give further explanations that might help you better understand why we must be cautious when comparing societies in terms of their perceived "development". Now that we explained why we, in this paper, are cautious of talking about "development" and "underdevelopment", let us very briefly present some aspects of discourse and its analysis.

Understanding discourse and its analysis

If discourse analysis is getting more recognition in development studies, before we further embark in this paper it must be noted that if you chose to study discourse, you might encounter disapproval (Ziai 2015). As we have argued elsewhere, discourse analysis is often viewed with reservations or criticized in the context of the study of "development" and "underdevelopment" (Delia Faille 2011; 2014). But very often, the criticism comes from misunderstanding of what discourse actually is. Discourse analysts face many commonly held ideas, as per the examples we have provided in the introduction of this paper. We believe that the best way for social scientists to justify the analysis of words, language and communication is to approach it with a clear definition of discourse that relates to the study of social relations and also to present convincing analysis. This section attempts to clarify our definition of discourse analysis and the following sections will attempt to illustrate how this analysis relates to the study of social relations and "development".

Social scientists studying discourses are examining the social and institutional constraints of language. At the conceptual level, language can be apprehended either as a social fact determined by material conditions and social domination, or as a field of social activity with specific rules and a social environment where meaning, social relations, and society are produced. Most discourse analysts adopt the latter conception. They attempt to reveal the strategies that aim to convey cultural values and ideologies, whether implicitly or explicitly. They define language as the production of meaning and the results of acts of communication that are conditioned by collective rules and social codes. Through the use of language, social groups and individuals come to build their identity, describe themselves, interact, and share ideas. Language is thus more than the use of specific vocabularies and grammars. It is an organized sequence of social acts that is not limited to speech or utterance. Some analysts study images and material artefacts as sequences of social acts and social strategies to convey ideologies.

In the 1960s French and British philosophers, sociologists and political scientists began to understand the production of language in terms of communication strategies. This new direction was dubbed the "linguistic turn" of humanities and social sciences (Rorty 1967). Based on several decades of debate in literary study, linguistics and anthropology, discourse analysis emerged as a new discipline. It proposed a way to see language as a field of social confrontation and struggles. Discourse is therefore understood as the social usage of language and studied as a social practice and a materialization of social relations. It means that discourse analysts are interested in the social practice of using language to put forward agendas, to express dissent, to defend a position, or to transmit values. They also study acts of silencing and censoring - such as prohibiting other worldviews from circulating and being heard. Therefore, discourse analysts see language as a series of social processes and they acknowledge that language is not limited to otherwise unrelated individual acts.

Discourse analysis could be described as a political understanding of the use of language in the context of unequal access to platforms of decision making, economic resources, and social recognition. As we will attempt to demonstrate throughout this paper, the study of discourse is not limited to looking for hidden agendas, lies or the uttering of meaningless and empty words. Deception is only one of the strategies used to convey worldviews, and it is not necessarily the most effective or even the most interesting for discourse analysts.

Some schools of discourse analysis criticize social reproduction of gender inequality, racism and social class. Critical Discourse Analysis is an example of this field. For this school of thought, discourse analysis is the social study of language, its social constraints and its effects (Fairclough 2001). Through language, social groups come to represent society in a way that perpetuates domination, positive or negative discrimination, and social repression. Critical discourse analysts look at the perpetuation of social conflicts and unequal relations of power. They examine issues related to gender, sexuality, social class, and ethnicity.

While our presentation of neoliberal discourses and its analysis does not fall totally under the umbrella of the school of Critical Discourse Analysis, this paper demonstrates how to analyse discourse in the context of the study of global inequalities, social discrimination and repression. We are critical of the current state of global politics, economy and society as it reproduces and reinforces inequalities. Therefore, the next section presents a critical analysis of neoliberalism understood as an ideology whose aim is to impose its ~~worldviews~~ (perspective) and the interest of the actors it attempts to defend and whose interests this ideology is putting forward in the context of development discourses.

**Our Alt:** **We can defend the rest of their advocacy and negate only certain parts. 2NR consolidation is the best alt:**

**One – no plan means any part of the 1AC can become the nexus question by the 2AR, we should reciprocally get to conditionally critique their frames and narrow the debate to parts of disagreement by the 2NR.**

**Two – – Praxis: our model teaches a form of engagement that corrects flaws in political strategies. Rejecting our approach is normatively worse for the Aff’s own cause.**

**Williams ’15** Douglas Williams is a third-generation organizer, He earned his BA in Political Science at the University of Minnesota at Morris and his MPA at the University of Missouri Columbia, where he was also a Thurgood Marshall Fellow and a Stanley Botner Fellow. He is currently a doctoral student in political science at Wayne State University in Detroit, where his research centers around public policy as it relates to disadvantaged communities and the labor movement. From the article: “The Dead End of Identity Politics” - From: The South Lawn - March 10, 2015 – Internally quoting Freddie DeBoer, Lecturer, Purdue University. DeBoer holds a PhD in Rhetoric and Composition from Purdue and an MA in English, concentration in Writing and Rhetoric from The University of Rhode Island, Modified for potentially objectionable language. In one instance a capital “B” was adjusted to a lower case “b” in a manner that boosted readability, but did not alter context. https://thesouthlawn.org/2015/03/10/the-dead-end-of-identity-politics/

Freddie **DeBoer** makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“: “This all largely descends from a related condition: **many in the** broad online **left** have adopted a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are presumed to be speaking from your side, and especially if they are seen as speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity, I understand the problem of undermining and derailing, and I recognize why people feel strongly that those who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege in our conversations. B(b)ut critique drift demonstrates why a healthy, functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately disarms (hampers) the left. **Refusing** to say ‘***this*** is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making ***that*** accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.” ----- (Williams is now no longer quoting DeBoer) Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness **and there will be no need for coalitions**, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed. But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and see one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.

**Three – contingent agreement is good: negating the whole aff makes only the most extreme stances strategic, like prejudice is good. We should debate framing strategies rather than impact turns to injustice**

**Four – its fair: frame subtraction auto gives the aff ground – just defend the stances of the 1AC. There are net benefits to this Alt other than just the Condit cards. It applies to other frames that we’ve critiqued.**

## Case

#### No Solvency – Rupture

The 1AC McKenzie ev calls for a politics of rupture. That gets trapped – over-focus on de-constructing misses what emerges in its wake.

Sitrin ‘13

Marina Sitrin is a writer, lawyer, teacher, organizer, militant and dreamer. She has a JD in International Womens’ Human Rights from CUNY Law School and a PhD in Global Sociology from Stony Brook University. “ Everyday revolutions” published in *Tidal*, a freely distributed radical magazine, May 9, 2013.

From Rupture to Creation What happens in the wake of this rupture, and how the often-inspiring moments which emerge in that space can become longer lasting, transforming the rupture into revolutions, is one of the biggest challenges we face in our movements around the world today. When formal institutions of power are laid bare, de facto or intentionally, people frequently come together, look to one another, and create new supportive relationships. These moments can be some of the most beautiful and full of solidarity that we ever experience. The question we face is how can they become longer lasting, transforming the ruptures into everyday revolutions. Rupture is a break. This break necessitates an opening. What many of us too often forget to do is bring to light what comes out of the fissure, not just the rejection, but the creation. Too often social scientists and scholars of revolution focus on the moment of rupture, and use that to explain the historical event. In Russia, the focus on the Revolution is only on the 1917 October Revolution and not the fact that at the time workers were running their own workplaces. In Occupy Wall Street in New York City, it was the holding of Zuccotti Park as a protest that was too often the focus, and not the change in social relationships and thousands of concrete projects that emerged in the wake of the taking of the park. The difference in the perspective and approach is key — if it is only on the against, or the physical taking of something, and not what is happening in the day to day, then real revolutionary change cannot be seen. And if we are not looking in the right places for transformation, it makes it much harder to ask useful questions moving forward, so as to deepen the transformations towards real revolutionary change.

#### **Their evidence in the small font explicitly says Indigenous and African Indigenous people can use settler institutions to their advantage.**

MSU = Blue

Boxell 21 [Mark, received his PhD in history from the University of Oklahoma. His current book project is tentatively titled Red Soil, White Oil: Petroleum and White Supremacy in the Progressive-Era United States, “From Native Sovereignty to an Oilman’s State: Land, Race, and Petroleum in Indian Territory and Oklahoma,” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era (2021), 20, 216–233, doi:10.1017/S1537781420000808//ak47]

In 1907, two geology professors, G.E. Condra and Charles N. Gould, published an informational tract in the Bulletin of the American Geographical Society touting Indian Territory’s prospects as a destination for industrious white settlers. Included in “Opening of the Indian Territory” was a narrative on the territory’s burgeoning petroleum industry, which Condra and Gould predicted would continue to grow. They lamented how the collective system of land tenure practiced by the territory’s Indigenous nations and “Government control” (a reference to federal restrictions) had retarded oil prospecting. However, in the authors’ eyes the allotment of Indian land into individual properties was quickly solving that problem; indeed, on the verge of statehood, Indian Territory contained thousands of oil wells and a “nearly continuous line of derricks,” seventy-five miles in length, that extended from southern Kansas to Tulsa. Condra and Gould’s interest in oil was perhaps predictable given their backgrounds in the infant science of geology. But their guide to Indian Territory was just as invested in explaining the region’s racial makeup. The two white authors noted the differences they saw between “full-blood,” “mixedblood,” and “quarter-breed” Indians; indicated that Cherokees had for years readily mixed with whites, while Creeks tended to marry into Black families; and insisted that white civilization was bound to overtake this mixed-race world. “The white man is to rule,” they stated, “and the problem of the Indian is largely solved in his amalgamation.” It had been the “destiny” of Indigenous people to “give [their] blood and a few strong traits” to white society, but to otherwise disappear. Meanwhile, “The negro is to remain a problem in social, educational, and industrial matters.” It was from this “cosmopolitan body” that the “crucible of civilization is to reduce a citizenship” in Indian Territory.1

Over the following two decades, establishing the white man’s citizenry that Condra and Gould envisioned turned out to be heavily rooted in funneling the streams of wealth that flowed from petroleum into the hands and pockets of whites, despite Indian Territory and Oklahoma’s status as a region of widespread Indigenous, African Indian, and African American landownership. The practices that allowed white people to remove oil wealth from Native and Black pockets were the product of a racialized mineral regime founded upon the settler principle that non-whites were especially incapable of self-governance in a world of petroleum abundance. This principle was baked into the settler-colonial policy of allotting collectively held tribal land into privately owned homesteads. As part of this process, white lawmakers and officials prevented newly-minted Indian landowners from alienating their allotments and mandated that white guardians oversee the leasing of land for oil production. Likewise, the State of Oklahoma required that white guardians oversee oil-rich allotments owned by Black citizens of the state’s Indian nations. While such rules ostensibly “protected” Indigenous and Black Indigenous landowners from losing their property, they provided a legal path through which white settlers seized Native property, squandered Black and Indigenous wealth, and forced Indians and other peoples of color off of the most desirable pieces of oil land.2

Allotment was a federally backed scheme to educate Natives in the traditions of economic individualism and cultural liberalism, to force Indigenous peoples to, as one historian puts it, learn the “whitening culture of capitalism.” However, the potential of great mineral wealth in Indian Territory destabilized this social-engineering project, which was built on the assumption that large swaths of land of relatively equal value could be easily divided among tribal citizens. Contrary to this, oil abundance offered a handful of “full-blood” Indians and African Natives unimaginable riches through the tapping of dormant petroleum resources, which undermined white reformers’ goals of transforming Native people into yeoman farmers and wage workers.3 For lawmakers, federal agents, and local officials and business owners, this threat to the reformative ethos of allotment helped justify white control of Natives’ oil inheritance. Oil booms threatened to equip people of color with social and economic power just as whites worked to define and instill a racial hierarchy that achieved the opposite. It became imperative for whites to closely manage Indigenous and Black petroleum property, not only as a means of expanding the former’s material possessions, but also as an avenue through which social difference could be more broadly policed and white sovereignty achieved. Despite this, Indigenous and African Indigenous individuals used settler institutions, such as state and county courts, to defend their right to oil-rich property and to leverage the racialized property regime that assumed their incompetence to their advantage.4

#### Contingency’s true. A singular theory to explain all power dynamics is wrong. It’s too sweeping, ignores history, and argues from premise-to-conclusion.

Thomas ‘18

Dr. Greg Thomas is an Associate Professor and teaches global Black Studies texts out of the English Department at Tufts University. The author holds a Ph.D. in Rhetoric from The University of California, Berkeley – Thomas is the author of three published books – including The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power: Pan-African Embodiment and Erotic Schemes of Empire; Hip-Hop Revolution in the Flesh: Power, Knowledge & Pleasure in Lil' Kim's Lyricism; and Word Hustle: Critical Essays and Reflections on the Work of Donald Goines, a collection co-edited with L.H. Stallings. From the Article: “Afro-Blue Notes: The Death of Afro-pessimism (2.0) ?” – From the Journal: Theory & Event, Volume 21, Number 1, January 2018 – p. 282-317 - Published by Johns Hopkins University Press- obtained via the Project MUSE - #CutWithRJ - Premium Collection Database.

There is here a general critical erasure of the massive tradition of Black anti-colonialism —or anti-colonial Black resistance to “anti-Black-ness” and anti-Black colonialism , which transcends nationalization. Wilderson’s “Afro-pessimist” rejects the anti-colonialist paradigms of supposedly “other” peoples, and yet in a manner that reinstates US or Western coloniality nonetheless—a white colonialism that oppresses “the Black” inside and outside the United States’s official geopolitical limits. This position can thus make a virtue out of automatic and abso-lute anti-alliance postures with no further, actual political action then required for Black people, “the Black critic,” or any Black liberation struggle on this view. Such chauvinism without political commitment or engagement beyond critique is logically consistent, for pessimism, where mere resentment or ressentiment can masquerade as resistance or “pro-Black” “radicalism.” After all, Afro-pessimism ( 2.0 ) begins with a proud suspicion of Black liberation or Black liberation move- ment, itself, no less than of its potentially “anti-racist” or “anti-Black” political alliances. This provincial “American” pessimism reveals more affinities with Créolite in the Caribbean than Césaire’s anti-colonialist eruption of Pan-African Négritude , in reality, its narrowly and nega- tively delimited rhetoric of the “Blackness” of “the Black” (as “Slave,” of course) notwithstanding. As if this too is a virtue, pessimism is not just suspicious of power but possibility—while, upholding dystopia, it is casually dismissive of all historical actuality that does not support a pessimist paradigm, orientation or sensibility. Analytically, moreover, there is somehow no white colonialism for Blacks to fight in Africa or Black countries of Black people anywhere and no terrible landlessness that afflicts the African diasporas of Blackness captive within white settler and/or imperial state formations, for Wilderson and Afro- pessimism ( 2.0 )

The pessimist rejection of anti-colonialism goes particularly awry with Fanon. The institution of academia came to Fanon late with great selectivity. It isolates him from the whole tradition of Black anti-colonialism (or anti-colonialist Blackness) so that he becomes a cipher, a sort of color-blinding Rorschach test even. In fact, Fanon is isolated from himself. The Fanon taken up like a weapon by the Black liberation movement of the 1960s and '70s with the "African Revolution" at large was a militant practitioner and is the author of an extant four-volume body of work recently even collected in the form of a hefty oeuvre complète by French as well as Arabic world publishers(i.e., La Découverte and Al Hibr). The Fanon examined in academia got reduced to a very few pages of Black Skin, White Masks, which was written when Fanon still thought he could be "French" and faithful to French colonial empire while opposing physiognomic but not cultural or "civilizational" racism. That text of the middle-class assimilé is of two minds—ambivalent with its currents of brilliance. Yet this [End Page 295] Fanon becomes "post-colonialist" for US academia when truthfully he becomes "anti-colonialist" and only later both in battle and in the related texts likewise disregarded by Afro-pessimism (2.0): Wilderson privileges the colonized Fanon rather than A Dying Colonialism and Toward the African Revolution as well as The Wretched of the Earth.

The standard suppression of The Wretched of the Earth cannot succeed in Red, White & Black. Wilderson tries to dichotomize Fanon so that Black Skin, White Masks (1952) is cast as a text about "race" and "slavery," and thereby "Blackness": The Wretched of the Earth is by contrast cast as a "post-colonial's" text primarily about "land restoration," or "settler colonialism," as if they can be cast apart from "Blackness" and Black struggles.32 This is a false dichotomy. Fanon's corpus does not yield this schism. It should go without saying that Black Skin, White Masks is itself a text of colonialism. It is often and falsely read as an exclusively "Caribbean" text, inapplicable to Afro-North America or even non-French colonies in the Caribbean, despite its central references to Chester Himes and Richard Wright as well as "Brer Rabbit" folklore; and even though this Fanon had written, "I come back to one fact: Wherever he goes, the Negro remains a Negro."33 The Wretched of the Earth is often and falsely read as an exclusively "Algerian" text, inapplicable to North America, despite its numerous references to "niggers" as well as Négritude or "Negro-African" culture—Blackness, especially for the Second Congress of Black Writers and Artists in Rome; despite its global "Third World" politics; and despite Fanon's aggressively militant Pan-Africanism. It remains easy for some to ignore Fanon's insistent categorization of the Algerian revolution as an African revolution as well as how "anti-Black racism" along with anti-Black slavery has lived on the African continent, not exclusively in Africa's Black diaspora. Curiously, Wilderson's Incognegro would expose the counter-insurgent canonization of Black Skin, White Masks in certain quarters, thanks to his youthful contact with the Black Panther Party, which did not dichotomize Blackness or anti-Blackness and colonialism or anti-colonialism in its own revolutionary Fanonism. It trafficked mostly in Les damnés de la terre: "…my father had caught me with it last night and beat the living daylights out of me—so I knew it must be good. That had never happened with Invisible Man. Then, using one of my old cocktail party gimmicks, I quoted a passage of Fanon from memory: 'From birth, I began,' it is clear to him that this narrow world, strewn with prohibition, can only be called into question by absolute violence.' I told Darnell that for some strange reason that had made me think about Kenwood, but why, I didn't know; nor did I know why my father had beaten me when Fanon's other book, Black Skin, White Masks, was nestled on his bookshelf beside the works of Sigmund Freud" (Wilderson 2008, 247).34 While Sexton counts the sum total of references to "Fanon" in Red, White & Black, as if this datum [End Page 296] alone should impress critical audiences, his tabulation begs the question of which Fanon is referenced and how in a manner all too faithful to the white academic management of Fanon and Fanonism as a crisis to be contained by whatever means:35 Red, White & Black seeks to quarantine The Wretched of the Earth from Kenwood or Minnesota, and all settler sites of US colonialism, conceding it away from "Blackness" in an ongoing quarrel with Native American, post-colonialist, and sometimes Palestinian "analogy," even though Wilderson needs to mine its rhetoric at key moments—to speak of putting the enemy "out of the picture" and bringing about "the end of the world" via "absolute violence," for example, when narratively these words then become the words of "Fanon" rather than those of The Wretched of the Earth specifically, given Wilderson's conventional academic preference for a colonially decontextualized Black Skin, White Masks.

No antithesis of "slavery," colonialism becomes unrecognizable as colonialism in Wilderson in ways sacrificial of the Blacks and Blackness subject to it—on and off official plantations. Firstly, colonialism cannot be granted as an object of study to "postcolonial" theory in US or Western academia. It can only appropriate the matter or study of colonialism—from the long history of anti-colonialist theory and praxes preceding it and persisting in spite of it—as a colonizing political act itself, an arrogant critical appropriation that Wilderson routinely accepts without question. What's more, slavery in "Plantation America" is colonial slavery, just as colonialism is a slaveocratic mode of colonialism in the Western Hemisphere. Walter Rodney was sure to note as much explicitly in articles such as "Slavery and Underdevelopment" (1979) as well as "Plantation Society in Guyana" (1981). There is no system of slavery in any part of these Americas that is not still settler colonial slavery; no settler colonialism without chattel slavery or racial slavery and their neo-slaveries. Finally in this regard, colonialism is not reducible to a simple matter of cartography—or "the postcolonial's capacity for cartographic restoration."36 The likes of C.A. Diop and Césaire aside, this is why Amilcar Cabral could write Our People Are Our Mountains (1972); and why Sylvia Wynter would engage Anibal Quijano's "coloniality of power" framework with "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom" (2003); and why one apparently disappeared Black radical tradition would theorize "internal colonialism" or "domestic colonialism" along with "eternal colonialism" and "neo-colonialism," from within the US imperial colony, long before the commercialization of "postcolonialism" or "postcolonial theory" in Western academia. This is further why Fanon himself would write in A Dying Colonialism: "It is not the soil that is occupied. It is not the ports or the airdromes. French colonialism has settled itself in the very center of the Algerian individual and has undertaken a sustained work of cleanup, of expulsion of self, of rationally pursued mutilation" (Fanon 1965, 65).37 This [End Page 297] is why Fanon himself would write for an El Moujahid article now in Toward the African Revolution: "True liberation is not that pseudo-independence in which ministers having a limited responsibility hobnob with an economy dominated by the colonial pact. Liberation is the total destruction of the colonial system, from the pre-eminence of the language of the oppressor and 'departmentalization,' to the customs union that in reality maintains the former colonized in the meshes of the culture, of the fashion, and of the images of the colonialist."38 This is also why it is important to recall that it was never a strictly cartographic colonialism bereft of slavery and Blackness that led Fanon to promulgate his vision of "new humanity" so fully and graphically in The Wretched of the Earth after A Dying Colonialism beyond Black Skin, White Masks.

Fanon's "Worlds," Revisited

Thus there is the serious problem of elliptical truncation in Wilderson's repeated quotation of the "end of the world" line taken from Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks. The "world" is never so generic and singular as pessimism would have it, whether in or outside this or that Fanon—whether it is the critical but "French" colonial Fanon or the radically decolonizing Fanon who wages pan-African revolt against the French and all colonialism. The younger Fanon wrote, "The Martinican is a man crucified. …[M]y friend had fulfilled in a dream his wish to become white—that is, to be man. …I will tell him, 'The environment, society are responsible for your delusion.' Once that has been said, the rest will follow of itself, and what that is we know. The end of the world."39 The "world" in question is quite a specific one. It is not the only world that is, or ever was, before another must be created into being out of necessity. It is the white world that represents itself "as if" (to borrow a turn of phrase from Wynter here) it were the only world in truth.

1. **Turn - The 1AC’s value stands on its own---responding to it with judgement and the ballot is a hollow validation that siphons off political energy and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy**

**Phillips 99** – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the **role of the critic**. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as **objects of investigation**. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, **the critic** is positioned as the **active agent of change** and the out-law discourse becomes **merely instrumental**. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic **contradicts** not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "**taking public speaking out of the streets** and **studying it in the classroom**, for treating it less as an **expression of protest**" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an **object for analysis** and **reproduction** within the **political economy of the academy**. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing **whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place**. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have **good reasons to stay hidden**. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be **brought into the arena of public surveillance** in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of **legitimacy** on the out-law community. **Nonetheless**, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially **destructive**. In an effort to **siphon the political energy** of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately **destroy** the dissatisfaction that serves as a **cathexis** for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might **take the place** of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create **any material changes** in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an **interested party**, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the **hidden**, aberrant texts of the out-law and **"rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible"** (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. **Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy**. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

#### The 1AC would carry less ableist baggage if the Mason ev used discourse other than the word “speak”. That linguistic choice boosts Ableist oppression

Ruhman ‘20

Internally quoting Sami Schalk, an associate professor in the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison - Abigail Ruhman is an opinion columnist who writes about politics and social issues - “Language is inherently political — and sometimes, ableist” – The Maneater - Feb. 26, 2020 - #E&F - https://themaneater.com/stories/opinion/column-language-is-inherently-political--and-sometimes-ableist

Sami Schalk, an associate professor in the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, examined the use of ableist metaphors in feminist writing in a 2013 article, published in Disability Studies Quarterly. Schalk explained that metaphors depend on a shared understanding of the thing being referenced. Despite metaphors being “essential speech acts,” not everyone has a shared experience of being blind, deaf, etc., meaning that the metaphor depends on an assumption that not everyone has.

Ziglar’s use of ableism is easier to spot than other forms of inspiration often used as calls to action. Schalk emphasizes that pointing out ableist language is not meant to police language, but to show how it is received or decoded. While Ziglar’s intention wasn’t inherently ableist, his message was.

It isn’t just Ziglar and a few others who fail to consider the impacts of their language. There are a lot of inspirational phrases and calls to action that exclude people with disabilities. Phrases like “speak out,” “step up” and a variety of others are commonly used as calls to action, but they create an image of the ability to be successful as a byproduct of not having a disability.

While using ableist insults is awful and needs to be stopped, the subtle use of ableism in language meant to inspire or motivate links failure to choices. This excuses the oppression and consistent inaccessibility present in society. There’s a reason that the quote, “The only disability in life is a bad attitude,” is so popular. Scott Hamilton, a figure skater who survived a cancerous brain tumor, turned this quote into his own personal motto. Finding motivation by treating the oppression experienced by other communities as an attitude problem isn’t inspirational — it contributes to the devaluation of human lives.

# 2NC

#### Aff deployment of the term “choice” is an especially powerful example of this neoliberal rhetoric that props-up the system.

Greene ‘12

et al; internally quoting John Budd – an Emeritus Prof in the College of Education and Human Development at the Univ of Missouri - Margaret Greene, Masters Graduate, Department of Computer and Information Sciences University of Strathclyde – “The emergence and impact of neoliberal ideology on UK public library policy, 1997-2010” - Library and Information Science Trends and Research: Europe, Volume 6 – Dec 4th - #E&F - https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/34342/1/greene\_mcmenemy\_revised.pdf

The reform of the public services in the UK has focused largely on a notion of citizens as consumers of public services, and is associated with wider social transition to a consumerist society and culture (Clarke & Newman, 2007). The hybrid term "citizen-consumer" is an example of an ideologizing collocation (Chun, 2009) first employed by New Labour in a Green paper on welfare reform in 1998 (Clarke, et aL, 2007). The debate surrounding the citizen-consumer is constructed around the binary distinction between state and the market and other related binaries: public/private; collective/individual; de-commodification/commodification (Clarke & Newman, 2007). Choice has also become the key term indicating a move towards a consumerist ~~stance~~ (perspective) in public services. Clarke et. al., (2007) state that the "choice" discourses that pervade New Labour policies on public service reform is derived directly from the market model of choice, which denotes choice being exercised by a "sovereign" consumer in pursuit of individual needs and aspirations.

Budd argues that neoliberalism operates most effectively through rhetoric (Budd, 2008) and consequently that the choice offered under this regime is illusionary and limited (p.174-75). The rhetoric of neoliberalism relies on naturalising the language of markets and transactions into everyday usage and which eventually means they can be represented as the truth.

#### The Aff deploys the phrase “monopoly”. This terminology originates from a neoliberal lexicon. It *occludes the aff’s alternate perspectives on the world* AND simultaneously *secures a system of neoliberal violence*.

Saltman ‘7

Kenneth J. Saltman is an associate professor in the Department of Education Policy Studies and Research of the School of Education at DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois. “Schooling in Disaster Capitalism: How the Political Right Is Using Disaster To Privatize Public Schooling” - Teacher Education Quarterly, Spring 2007 - #E&F - https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ795160.pdf

In education, neoliberalism has pervasively infiltrated with radical implications, remaking educational practical judgment and forwarding the privatization and deregulation program. The steady rise of privatization and the shift to business language and logic can be understood through the extent to which neoliberal ideals have succeeded in taking over educational debates. Neoliberalism appears in the now common sense framing of education through presumed ideals of upward individual economic mobility (the promise of cashing in knowledge for jobs) and the social ideals of global economic competition. In this view national survival hinges upon educational preparation for international economic supremacy. The preposterousness of this assumption comes as school kids rather than corporate executives are being blamed for the global economic race to the bottom. The "TINA" thesis (There Is No Alternative to the Market) that has come to dominate politics throughout much of the world has infected educational thought as omnipresent market terms such as "accountability," "choice," "efficiency," "competition," "monopoly," and "performance" frame educational debates. Nebulous terms borrowed from the business world such as "achievement," "excellence," and "best practices" conceal ongoing struggles over competing values, visions, and ideological perspectives. (Achieve what? Excel at what? Best practices for whom? And says who?) The only questions left on reform agendas appear to be how to best enforce knowledge and curriculum conducive to individual upward mobility within the economy and national economic interest as it contributes to a corporately managed model of globalization as perceived from the perspective of business. This is a dominant and now commonplace view of education propagated by such influential writers as Thomas Friedman in his books and New York Times columns, and such influential grant-givers as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

#### “Stakeholder” is one of the core terms

Eagleton-Pierce ‘16

This is the opening section and it outlines the 44 terms the author feel are essential components of the neoliberal vocabulary - Matthew Eagleton-Pierce is Lecturer in International Political Economy, SOAS, University of London -From the book: Neoliberalism: The Key Concepts - 1st Edition - Copyright Year 2016 - #E&F – modified for language that may offend - https://www.ppesydney.net/dissecting-buzzwords-neoliberalism/

Neoliberalism: The Key Concepts provides a critical guide to a vocabulary that has become globally dominant over the past forty years. The language of neoliberalism both constructs and expresses a particular ~~vision~~ (conception) of economics, politics, and everyday life. Some find this vision to be appealing, but many others find the contents and implications of neoliberalism to be alarming. Despite the popularity of these concepts, they often remain confusing, the product of contested histories, meanings, and practices. In an accessible way, this interdisciplinary resource explores and dissects key terms such as:

• Capitalism

• Choice

• Competition

• Entrepreneurship

• Finance

• Flexibility

• Freedom

• Governance

• Market

• Reform

• Stakeholder

• State

Complete with an introductory essay, cross-referencing, and an extensive bibliography, this book provides a unique and insightful introduction to the study of neoliberalism in all its forms and disguises.

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#### This also address every Aff link claim about the surrounding “context of its deployment”. These terms provide an opening for the neoliberal encroachment. It is bett*er* to endorse the 1AC sans any such rhetoric.

Budd ‘97

John Budd is an Emeritus Prof in the College of Education and Human Development at the Univ of Missouri –“A Critique of Customer and Commodity” - College & Research Libraries – vol 58:4 - #E&F – obtained via the EBSCO Open Access Journals Database

Discussion

One of the most important things to keep in mind with regard to customers and commodities is that the language librarians use to describe their purpose and activities inevitably will define, even if they do not initially reflect, thought. For instance, even though Brown says that "it is useful to understand more about the service interaction and what it is that makes 'buying' and evaluating a service (such as reference service) different for the customer than 'buying' and evaluating a material product," she proceeds to speak of consumption and retail analogy to describe reference work in academic libraries.34 The language employed is a powerful shaping force, and that force, in this context, is tied to the discourse of consumption. Baudrillard says that "consumption is the virtual totality of all objects and messages constituted in a more or less coherent discourse. Consumption, in so far as it is meaningful, is a systematic act of the manipulation of signs [italics in original]."35 Signs, in the Saussurean linguistic sense, are composed of the totality of the signifier and the signified. The focus on the customer approach and information as commodity embodies a shift from primary attention on the signified to attention centered on the signifier. The signified is the content, concept, or idea; the signifier is an expression, a sound-image, or form. In other words, the transformation is one from substance to form.

In another sense, the transformation moves from semantics (meaning) to rhetoric (expression). Emery writes that "'Without consumers, the marketer of economic goods and services does not have a market.' Similarly, without readers the library lacks its raison d'etre. Though in one case an individual may be called a 'consumer' and in the other a 'reader,' the difference is purely semantic."36 In actuality, Emery is dismissing the semantic and championing the rhetorical. In the more thoughtful connections of library purpose to capital, a kind of schizophrenia reigns. The schizoid tendency is evident in the conflict that Repo struggles with. Although he advocates economic analysis of information, he repeatedly reminds the reader (and himself) of the use value of information ("The value of information is fully explicated in its use."37) In less thoughtful treatments certainty governs. For example, in urging the customer approach, Weingand advocates the "paradigm" of consumerism as superior to the view of the library as a public good (noted above). It seems to matter little that the language adopted is a usurpation of ideas that either do not apply or apply imperfectly to the library's situation.

Weingand's statement is not value neutral. In fact, it is an exemplar of the Foucauldian will to truth and knowledge which, as Foucault observes, "like the other systems of exclusion, relies on institutional support: it is both reinforced and accompanied by whole strata of practices," and is "profoundly accompanied by the manner in which knowledge is employed in a society, the way it is exploited, divided and, in some ways, attributed. . . . [T]his will to knowledge, thus reliant upon institutional support and distribution, tends to exercise a sort of pres-sure, a power of constraint upon other forms of discourse."38 The impact on knowledge is profound and debilitating. The effect is best expressed by Lyotard:

The nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged within this context of general transformation. . . . The relationship of the suppliers and users of knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use is now tending, and will increasingly tend, to assume the form already taken by the relationship of commodity producers and consumers to the commodities they produce and consume—that is, the form of value. Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself, it loses its "use-value."39

Finally, the discourse on customer and commodity in the academic library takes on the characteristics of ideology. Specifi-cally, it is ideological in that it asserts a dominance over other discourses, and does so through distortion of context that all but eliminates any teleological sense. As Hawkes points out, two aspects of ideology —"instinctive deferral to 'the facts' as they are immediately represented to us, and blind faith in instrumental science —are the most dangerous effects of commodity fetishism. In order for a thing to become a commodity, the coercive power of human reason must be exerted over the thing-in-itself: we must represent it as what it is not, and then take the representations for the reality."40 Ultimately, librarians need to take care with the language they adopt, and with the facility with which they use it to shape concepts. That the language of consumerism and commodification dominates beyond the sphere of libraries is not sufficient reason to accept it uncritically. The library's language, and practice, should flow from as clear an idea of purpose as possible. And librarians should examine purpose independently from the pressures of capitalism and consumption.

## CASE

#### It’s not just D – if the Aff fails to generate new collectives it’s non-workable concept is a trap that empowers reigning ideologies. This is especially true since the Aff’s starting point is a Debate-Community specific criticism – items like Verbatim or Chris Thiele’s software may be meaningful– but they are not examples of tech that are widely deployed outside of the small universe that is college debate.

Bryant ‘12

(Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, “Critique of the Academic Left”, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, *and when we do*, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc. What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle. I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation. “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

#### Rupture is much better at deconstruction than considering what will emerge in its own wake. We can win on this alone bc Rupture’s deconstruction means worse and more violent modes of abstention-ism

Wolin ‘4

(Richard, B.A. from Reed College--M.A. and Ph.D. from York University in Toronto--D.D. McMurtry Professor of History at Reed College and Rice University, The seduction of unreason : the intellectual romance with fascism : from Nietzsche to postmodernism, p. 233)

With these remarks Derrida insinuates that existing democratic societies are incapable of self-reflection. Instead, they have an endemic tendency to fuse "empirical" and "normative" momentsa debatable claim. Such an interpretive approach as deconstruction is necessary, Derrida implies, to produce a critical space at a sufficient remove from the manifold failings of existing democratic practice. Derrida's writing over the last decade has been replete with analogous reassurances concerning deconstruction's political relevance. What seems less convincing, however, given deconstruction's willful lexical abstruseness, are the practical implications of such avowals. For example, how can we be sure that Derrida's self-avowed fascination with discourses on the"double bind" and the "impossible"-the paradoxical challenge of relying on a discredited metaphysical vocabulary while at the same time fully recognizing its dysfunctionality-is not merely **conducive to indecision and fence-straddling rather than** to **meaningful political engagement**?36 Moreover, in what ways might deconstruction's trademark "playfulness" be conducive to political earnestness? Lastly, since deconstructionqua political discourse seems to privilege the "negative" moments of "destabilization" and "dismantling," how might it counter the suspicion that it **remains** constitutionally **incapable of fostering political solidarity**: the democratic ideal of politics as an equitable and just framework for realizing collective goals and projects. From his very first texts, Derrida has always emphasized the positional or contextual nature of deconstruction. His recent preoccupation with politics is no exception. Since the early 1990s, Derrida has sought to reposition his thought to counter charges of apoliticism, the widespread suspicion that deconstruction is interested in little more than the "free play of signification." Nevertheless, often his efforts have failed to go beyond a few rather abstract and perfunctory invocations of "responsibility" and "openness toward the other," as in the remarks quoted above. **Thus, in lieu of** a more **concrete specification** of the meaning of openness, of the particular "others" toward whom we should open ourselves, of how we should open ourselves to the other and why, and **of how we might translate** the **ethical** maxim of **"openness"** in**to** forms of **practical** life **conduct** or everyday institutional settings**, we are left with a directive that,** in its generality and imprecision, **seems more frustrating than illuminating**. As one critic has remarked, despite its apparent merits, the inordinate stress on otherness seems indicative of an endemic "other-worldliness" that suffuses deconstructionist discussions of real world politics.3? In certain respects the problematic of "otherness"-a distinctly Levinasian inheritance-raises more questions than solves. This standpoint's criticism of the modern natural law tradition-the normative basis of the contemporary democratic societies-is sweeping and total to the point that democratic ideals themselves seem indefensible, and in this way undermines a politics of "reasonable democracy." Instead, **we are left with a "political existentialism," in which, given the "groundless" nature of moral and political choice, one political "decision" seems almost as good as another**.

#### ( ) Discussion of “rupture” masks flaws. It links to every Critique the Aff made on Topicality bc it reifies and limits to a new wave of boundaries

Stevenson ‘14

Michael Stevenson, Assistant Professor at the University of Groningen, Netherlands, summary from his talk at the Association of Internet Researchers conference. 10/24/2014.

What rupture-talk does is to obscure: it flags certain desired properties by hiding others that are far less obvious. It restricts and privileges: it favours certain courses of action while making others appear a great deal less desirable. It inscribes: it positions certain metaphors and models as central. And it animates: it points to specific courses of actions that should be taken. For a richer discussion of new media history, we need to investigate the role of rupture-talk much further, then.

#### ( ) That boosts violence and is turn in their framework.

Barnett ‘10

Clive Barnett – Faculty of Social Sciences and Reader in Human Geography at The Open University. From Chapter Twelve – “PUBLICS AND MARKETS: What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?” – From the book: The Handbook of Social Geography, edited by Susan Smith, Sallie Marston, Rachel Pain, and John Paul Jones III. London and New York: Sage. Available via http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett\_publicsandmarkets.pdf

In accepting the same simplistic opposition between individual freedom and social justice presented by Hayek, but simply reversing the evaluation of the two terms, critics of neoliberalism end up presenting highly moralistic forms of analysis of contemporary political processes. In resisting the idealization of the market as the embodiment of public virtue, they end up embracing an equally idealized view of the forum as the alternative figure of collective life (see Elster 1986). For example, while Harvey insists that neoliberalism is a process driven by the aim of restoring class power, he ends his analysis by arguing that it is the anti-democratic character of neoliberalism that should be the focal point of opposition (Harvey 2005, 205-206). But it is far from clear whether the theories of neoliberalism and neoliberalization developed by political economists, sometimes with the help of governmentality studies, can contribute to reconstructing a theory and practice of radical democratic justice. In Harvey’s analysis, the withdrawal of the state is taken for granted, and leads to the destruction of previous solidarities, unleashing pathologies of anomie, anti-social behaviour and criminality (ibid, 81). In turn, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the state leads to social solidarities being reconstructed around other axes, of religion and morality, associationism, and nationalism. What has been described as the rise of the “movement society”, expressed in the proliferation of contentious politics of rights-based struggles and identity politics, Harvey sees as one aspect of a spread of corrosive social forms triggered by the rolling-back of states. In the wake of this rolling-back “[e]verything from gangs and criminal cartels, narco-trafficking networks, mini-mafias and favela bosses, through community, grassroots and non-governmental organizations, to secular cults and religious sects proliferate” (ibid, 171). These are alternative social forms “that fill the void left behind as state, powers, political parties and other institutional forms are actively dismantled or simply wither away as centres of collective endeavour and of social bonding” (ibid.). What’s really wrong with neoliberalism, for critics who have constructed it as a coherent object of analysis, is the unleashing of destructive pathologies through the combined withdrawal of the state and the unfettered growth of market exchange. ‘Individual freedom’ is presented as a medium of uninhibited hedonism, which if given too much free reign undermines the ascetic virtues of self-denial upon which struggles for ‘social justice’ are supposed to depend. Underwritten by simplistic moral denunciations of ‘the market’, these theories cover over a series of analytic, explanatory, and normative questions. In the case of both the Marxist narrative of neoliberalization, and the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal governmentality, it remains unclear whether either tradition can provide adequate resources for thinking about the practical problems of democracy, rights and social justice. This is not helped by the systematic denigration in both lines of thought of ‘liberalism’, a catch-all term used with little discrimination. There is a tendency to present neoliberalism as the natural end-point or rolling-out of a longer tradition of liberal thought – an argument only sustainable through the implicit invocation of some notion of a liberal ‘episteme’ covering all varieties and providing a core of meaning. One of the lessons drawn by diverse strands of radical political theory from the experience of twentieth-century history is that struggles for social justice can create new forms of domination and inequality. It is this that leads to a grudging appreciation of liberalism as a potential source for insight into the politics of pluralistic associational life. The cost of the careless disregard for ‘actually existing liberalisms’ is to remain blind to the diverse strands of egalitarian thought about the relationships between democracy, rights and social justice that one finds in, for example: post-Rawslian political philosophy; post-Habermasian theories of democracy, including their feminist variants; various postcolonial liberalisms; the flowering of agonistic liberalisms and theories of radical democracy; and the revival of republican theories of democracy, freedom, and justice. No doubt theorists of neoliberalism would see all this as hopelessly trapped within the ‘neoliberal frame’ of individualism, although if one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, even Marx’s critique of capitalist exploitation, dependent as it is on an ideal of self-ownership, is nothing more than a variation on Lockean individual rights.

**Many disparities disprove their thesis and, even if correct, it doesn’t prove racism is ontological. Their entire apparatus is ideologically sealed and self-serving.**

**Reed 18 –** Adolph Reed Jr., Professor at the Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, PhD and MA in Political Science from Atlanta University, “Antiracism: A Neoliberal Alternative To A Left”, Dialectical Anthropology, Volume 42, Issue 2, June, SpringerLink

Those **quotidian realities** put pressure on the **reductionist** premise that racial subordination remains the dominant ideological or material framework generating and sustaining systemically reproduced inequalities and class power. This tension underlies a source the appeal of **ontological views** of racism as an animate force that transcends time and context. Because it is an evanescent Evil that is disconnected from specific human purposes and patterns of social relations, racism, again like “terrorism,” can exist anywhere at any time under any manifest conditions and is a cause that needs no causes or explanation. That is why statistical demonstration of apparent racial disparities seems within antiracist discourse to be self-sufficient evidence of the persistence of racism’s paramount impact on black Americans, despite the fact that findings of disparity: (1) are not surprising considering how entrenched inequalities work; (2) do not tell us much, if anything, about the proximate sources of the disparities; and (3) do not point to remedial responses, although those retailing the findings often present them as though they do. As Chowkwanyun and I indicate, moreover, relentless commitment to finding disparities and insistence that manifest inequalities be understood in those terms despite those interpretive failings **suggests the presence of other ideological factors**: [Disparitarian discourse’s] commitment to a fundamentally essentialist and ahistorical race-first view is betrayed in the constantly expanding panoply of neologisms – “institutional racism,” “systemic racism,” “structural racism,” “colourblind racism,” post-racial racism,” etc. – intended to **graft more complex social dynamics** onto a **simplistic** and frequently **psychologistic** racism/antiracism political ontology. Indeed, these efforts bring to mind [Thomas] Kuhn’s account of attempts to accommodate mounting anomalies to **salvage an interpretive paradigm** in danger of crumbling under a crisis of authority. And in this circumstance as well the salvage effort is driven by powerful material and **ideological imperatives** (Reed and Chowkwanyun 2012, 167). That ontological view of racism is what enabled Bell’s insistence that nothing has changed for black Americans since 1865 without having to confront apparently disconfirming evidence of his **own biography** and the **context of his declaration**. It also underlies the preference for invoking **historical analogies** in lieu of argument. The point of those analogies is not to **explain** the mechanisms through which contemporary inequalities are reproduced. It is to **preserve the interpretive framework** that identifies racism as the definitive source of those inequalities.

**Contingency is the best explanation**

**Rinehart ‘16**

Nicholas T. Rinehart, Department of English, Harvard University, Lead Coordinator for Graduate Colloquia and co-coordinator of the Race & Ethnicity Graduate Colloquium, Affiliate of the Afro-Latin American Research Institute at the Hutchins Center for African and African American Research, The Man That Was a Thing: Reconsidering Human Commodification in Slavery, Journal of Social History, Volume 50, Number 1, Fall 2016, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/631853

Smallwood’s analysis of these supposed techniques of “commodification” is thus deeply indebted to Orlando Patterson’s **concept of social death:** “slavery is the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.”33 Smallwood finds her “middle ground” in this condition—a legally or socially liminal state between initial enslavement and ultimate manumission and an ontologically liminal state between being and nonbeing: physical life without social life, belonging to no social community yet provisionally incorporated within a larger social order. Smallwood’s account is striking in how it maps techniques of “commodification” directly onto Patterson’s articulation of “social death.” The slave’s ontologically liminal space is precisely where “human commodification was possible,” where the slave is “reduced” to “currency” by severed social ties, violent domination, and general maltreatment. Vincent Brown has rightly noted how **strict** adherence to Patterson’s theory of social death can cause **serious interpretive problems** in the study of slavery. “It is often forgotten that the concept of social death is a distillation from Patterson’s breathtaking survey,” Brown writes, “a theoretical abstraction that is meant not to describe the lived experiences of the enslaved so much as to reduce them to a least common denominator that could reveal the essence of slavery in an ideal-type slave, shorn of meaningful heritage.”34 The flaw in Smallwood’s account is that she allows “the condition of social death to stand for the experience of life in slavery.”35 Hence, Smallwood’s (and others’) description of the thoroughly “dehumanized” or “commodified” slave is largely **ahistorical**; it maps itself directly onto a sociological abstraction, leaving **no room** for **historical contingency** or **local variation**. **It presumes the outcome** of “**commodification” and describes all aspects of enslavement as constituting or producing that outcome**. Indeed, the question that looms over all this analysis is: What aspects of Atlantic slavery, if any, might not have contributed to human “commodification?” If we suppose that captives were bought and sold along the west coast of Africa but that they were reasonably well fed, would these captives still be “commodified?” If slaves were not segregated by sex aboard slave ships, would they still be “commodified?” What if captives were kept in prisons, but not held in chains—would that make a difference? Analyses of the transatlantic slave trade like that above confuse **historical contingency** with **theoretical fact**. If anything, Smallwood’s emphasis on the biological aspect of “commodification” undermines the very concept itself. Smallwood writes that, “Because human beings were treated as inanimate objects, [End Page 35] the number of bodies stowed aboard a ship was limited only by the physical dimensions and configuration of those bodies.”36 This assertion that “human beings were treated as inanimate objects” contradicts the earlier statement that slave traders “reduced people to the sum of their biological parts.” How can something be both biological and inanimate? And more, when Smallwood claims that slave merchants were “probing the limits up to which it is possible to discipline the body without extinguishing the life within,” she is also revealing slavers’ recognition of the continued physical vitality and biological life of the slave. Patterson himself states this outright: “A dead slave, or one incapacitated by brutalization, was a useless slave.”37 In defining the power relation internal to slavery, Patterson further observes that “Perhaps the most distinctive attribute of the slave’s powerlessness was that it always originated . . . as a substitute for death, usually violent death.”38 And this is because slaves can die.39 I contend that even the horrific practices of starvation, torture, and other forms of “psychic and social” violence enacted upon slaves reveal a profound investment in and acknowledgement of the humanity of enslaved people by their enslavers. I use the word “investment” intentionally and ironically to argue that perpetrators of slavery, rather than treating slaves simply as inanimate things, marketable products, or exchangeable commodities—as things—understood them as thoroughly human. “Scientific” efforts to starve African captives rely on the presumption that captives can be starved. To violently subject captives to “unmitigated poverty” and deprive them of their social and familial ties is to make the fundamental concession that enslaved Africans could be violently subjected to poverty, that they could be deprived of social and familial ties. One cannot alienate a cowrie shell or starve a bale of cotton. This social fact is most evident when we venture beyond the representational mode of “commodification” and into the realm of everyday human contact. The exact terms in which Patterson defines “social death” confirm this much: If the slave is violently dominated, natally alienated, and generally dishonored, then we must recognize that only a human can be so dominated, so alienated, and so dishonored. As Patterson writes, “The counterpart of the master’s sense of honor is the slave’s experience of its loss. The so-called servile personality is merely the outward expression of this loss of honor.”40 This “experience . . . of loss” implies the loss of something that was once there. In sum, Smallwood’s stunning account of the Middle Passage—surely the best we have in the literature on slavery—would be enriched by redirecting analytical attention to how this particular historical process hinged upon, rather than depleted, the humanity and vulnerability of its victims. A Better Model: Commodity-as-Process Historians of slavery striving to demonstrate the “commodification” of enslaved people have been led astray by strict adherence not only to Patterson’s “social death” but also to Marx’s theory of the commodity. In his discussion of the United States’ internal slave trade and the sexual abuse of enslaved women, Edward Baptist constructs a theory of commodification that marries Marx’s commodity fetishism with Freud’s sexual fetishism. This theoretical framework is [End Page 36] troubling from the start, if only because Marx’s formulation of the commodity and commodity fetishism is arguably inapplicable here. According to Marx, “This Fetishism of commodities has its origin . . . in the peculiar social character of the labour that produces them.”41 And when Marx mentions “labour,” we should assume that he does not mean the reproductive sort. Indeed, Marx’s entire conception of the commodity as social use-value is grounded in the dynamic between human labor on one side and human want on the other. The commodity as social use-value is determined by the quantity of human labor embodied within it, representing the labor-time socially necessary for its production. Commodities are “only definite masses of congealed labour-time.”42 Marx’s articulation of commodity fetishism is thus not particularly suited to the perception or treatment of enslaved people. Baptist’s ensuing examination of the “commodification” of enslaved people—regarding the slave sale or auction, and the rape of enslaved women—demonstrates the instability of this rhetoric. In the first case, Baptist describes the “deanimation of enslaved people” as “virtually inanimate articles”43 and their subsequent “reanimation” as a “lifeless commodity”44 when they are made to pose, flex their muscles, dance, and play instruments or card games in slave pens where traders meticulously examined their bodies. Slaves were made “to demonstrate their salability by outwardly performing their supposed emotional insensibility and physical vitality,”45 as Walter Johnson writes of Louisiana slave markets. Baptist does not, however, see the apparent contradiction here—that slavers were invested in, dependent upon, the fundamentally human liveliness of their captives. Slaves were not just “reanimated” as “market myths”46 but as flesh capable of withstanding immense suffering. More central to Baptist’s amalgam of commodity and sexual fetishism is the frequent rape of enslaved women by slave traders. Several conclusions emerge from his discussion of the slave market and sexual abuse: first, that enslaved women were regarded by their traders as “impassioned”47 objects; second, that traders used these objects to satisfy their sexual desires, to assert their masculinity, to “erase dependence” and “forget fears”48 by exerting control over them; and third, that this capacity for sexual objectification was bought and sold in the slave markets of the United States. I maintain, on the contrary, that such historical instances of rape and sexual abuse do not signify the objectification of enslaved women. It seems rather that slave traders took pleasure in the inability of their “fancy maids” to express sexual consent. This powerlessness on the part of women who were not “people whose opinions must be considered” suggests that these women had opinions that were disregarded, that they had control or power over their lives and bodies that was suppressed. To take such pleasure in the displeasure, the lack of consent, the powerlessness of another is—perhaps counterintuitively—to recognize the humanity of that person. Baptist’s brilliant analysis of slave trader correspondences, specifically showing how their coded language of sexual conquest represented enslaved women as “commodities,” is less convincing in the material (and nonrepresentational) realm of everyday intimacy. Slavers were always deeply invested in slaves’ necessarily human—“frail, sentient, resistant”49—capacity for suffering.50 Such analytical inconsistencies are caused not only by the reductive “neo-abolitionist” ways we think about slavery but also by the rigid application of inadequate theoretical models. Simply put, Marx’s conception of the commodity does [End Page 37] not work in such studies, perhaps because its static quality does not sufficiently describe a historical experience that is thoroughly processual. As a possible remedy, I suggest that historians of slavery adopt Igor Kopytoff’s theory of the commodity-as-process. This model is best suited to our field of inquiry because it reflects the lived experience of enslavement itself. We first must acknowledge that “slavery” refers to a vast and nebulous web of associations and histories. Modern racial slavery, as a world-historical phenomenon, had many moving parts. From the coasts of Africa, to the Atlantic Middle Passage, to the shores of the New World, to the plantations and cities of the Americas, back and forth throughout the internal slave routes—the life of a single slave often comprised an accumulated series of various forms of enslavement. Any one of these stages might vary greatly. As Walter Johnson writes, the “daily process of the slave trade” involved “Many slaves trades, many versions of what was happening [that] met and were contested in every sale.”51 In order best to understand how “slavery” varied so widely across time and space—how slaves often passed between different modes of enslavement—we must embrace an appropriately flexible and contingent theoretical model. I would suggest further that the very word “slavery” itself is meaningless insofar as it attempts to describe abstractly what was historically a set of changing, disparate, and transitional circumstances and experiences.52 That is, enslavement was always profoundly processual in nature—but not just in the sense of bondage and freedom, life and death, being and nonbeing. It was so with respect to itself, with respect to the mundane life of the slave, with respect to the multiple slaveries endured by any single man or woman throughout a lifetime. Kopytoff acknowledges this precisely: “What we see in the career of a slave is a process of initial withdrawal from a given original social setting, his or her commoditization, followed by increased singularization (or decommoditization) in the new setting, with the possibility of later recommoditization.”53 This approach enables us to envision the slave not as a static, “commodified” entity but rather as a social figure that moves through various phases of expulsion, marginality, and reincorporation. Kopytoff’s formulation is also particularly useful for re-examining the contexts of Smallwood’s and Baptist’s work, respectively—the slave market (whether on the Gold Coast or in the American South) and the plantation. Commodity-as-process suggests that “The only time when a commodity status of a thing is beyond question is the moment of actual exchange.”54 Beyond the singular, ephemeral moment of purchase, the enslaved subject is then “decommoditized” in a process Kopytoff calls “singularization,” though often (if not always) able to be “recommoditized.” As such, the enslaved person in whatever context becomes a “potential commodity,” endowed with “an exchange value even if they have been effectively withdrawn from their exchange sphere and deactivated, so to speak, as commodities.”55 In the parlance of our historiography, this is the chattel principle; Kopytoff helps us understand how the plantation laborer, for example, is not definitionally a “commodified” individual but rather a “potential commodity.”56 Commodity-as-process skirts the theoretical and historical pitfalls of the so-called “commodification” of enslaved humanity in four ways. First, it productively revises a strictly Marxian conception of the commodity-fetish.57 Second, the observation that the commodity only truly exists in the “moment of actual exchange” enables us to realize that torture, starvation, and rape—the total [End Page 38] brutalization of the slave—is predicated on the presumed humanity of the victim. Third, it provides a manner of speaking about the “commoditization” of enslaved people without resorting to the normative impulses found in the historiographical opposition between person and thing. And finally, it is thoroughly historical. Miller urges that the global history of enslavement be rethought as a “historical process.”58 Slaving, he writes, was a strategy, not a sociological abstraction or simply an “institution.” And he reminds us that the study of enslavement should focus explicitly on humans and humans acting in order to go “beyond the passivity of suffering and domination.”59 Kopytoff’s theory of the commodity-as-process offers a suitable vocabulary and theoretical toolkit to meet such an occasion. We might consider, for example, how such framing might have enhanced Smallwood’s account of the successive processes of “turning African captives into Atlantic commodities” and “turning Atlantic commodities into American slaves,” where instead of the sociological flattening of “social death” we had the dynamism of Kopytoff’s description of the multi-phased career of the slave. We might also consider how, from this perspective, the slave auction in Baptist’s analysis might render the slave “commoditized” yet not necessarily “lifeless,” positioned interstitially such that the commodity status of the slave can be reactivated, deactivated, or potentialized without becoming permanent, definitional, or ontological. Commodity-as-process thus enables us to imagine historical enslavement in new ways that do not make recourse to such static and normative paradigms buttressed by “social death,” Marxian commodity fetish, or any other inadequate theoretical position. Reparative Semantics? That we might come to understand enslavement as thoroughly processual has been highlighted by recent scholarship describing the so-called “second slavery.” This work maintains that there was a fundamental transformation in the scalar, geographical, and technological aspects of slavery in the nineteenth century that made it both specifically modern and capitalistic. Atlantic slavery was thus reconfigured by the production of new staple commodities (especially cotton) in unprecedented quantities, the sweeping migration of enslaved people as well as slaveholders to regions previously marginal to the Atlantic economy (the Deep South, western Cuba, the interior of Jamaica, and south-central Brazil, among others), the incorporation of biological and technological innovations for harvesting crops, and a newfound reliance on often excessive financial speculation.60 The “second slavery” importantly “calls attention to the continual re-formation of slavery”61 and demonstrates conclusively, if somewhat ambiguously, the mutual historical embeddedness of racial slavery and the advent of global capitalism. Indeed, the relevant question for historians of slavery is no longer whether slavery was capitalistic—as it may have been for previous generations of scholars who emphasized the premodern, feudalistic, and paternalist aspects of American slavery—but precisely how and why (and when) slavery and capitalism converged so forcefully. Yet there are still analytical hurdles to overcome in parsing the relation between slavery and capitalism. As John J. Clegg observes, one central problem running throughout this new scholarship is the refusal to define capitalism itself. While several scholars have given names to the phenomena they describe—Walter Johnson’s “slave-racial capitalism” and Sven Beckert’s “war capitalism” [End Page 39] come immediately to mind—Clegg notes that “by dodging the problem of definition altogether they fail to provide a coherent account of capitalist slavery.”62 Another unresolved tension in this body of work is the conjunction of historical process and transformation with a critical vocabulary, as described above, that is insufficiently dynamic. Resorting to the concept of enslaved “commodification” in order to highlight the “dehumanizing” features of a highly profitable and financially sophisticated system of production based on unfree labor—in short, that this new kind of slavery “was tightly linked to the intensity and profits of industrial capitalism”63—belies the profound rupture at the heart of the “second slavery.” If we can speak of the “commodified” slave in both seventeenth-century Africa and nineteenth-century Mississippi, then it becomes increasingly difficult to argue that “the second slavery defines a distinct period of Atlantic history.”64 Moreover, the repeated emphasis on the increasingly strict and, in many cases, tortuous work regimes that compelled enslaved people to produce cotton and sugar in unprecedented quantities at an unprecedented rate in the nineteenth century reveals again slaveholders’ profound investment in the laboring, suffering body of the slave. This burgeoning research on mass slavery and its capitalistic aspects would be strengthened by increased attention to how such historical transformations—clearly resonant with a Kopytoffian vocabulary—did not signal the erosion of enslaved peoples’ humanity but rather were built upon it. In addition, this newfound emphasis on slave exploitation and the onset of modern industrial capitalism has resuscitated debates about the language of history. Recent writing has urged the substitution of the phrase “enslaved person” for the word “slave.” One article suggests we opt for “enslaved person” because such historical subjects were “humans first, commodities second,” thereby “restoring identity, reversing a cascade of institutional denials and obliterations.” “Slave,” on the other hand, is allegedly a “nonhuman noun.”65 This argument is not new. Deborah Gray White writes in the preface to the revised edition of her seminal study Ar’n’t I a Woman?: Female Slaves in the Plantation South (1999) that were she to rewrite her book, she would opt for “enslaved” rather than “slave”: “The noun ‘slave’ suggests a state of mind and being that is absolute and unmediated by an enslaver. ‘Enslaved’ says more about what happened to black people without unwittingly describing the sum total of who they were.”66 This same rhetoric was later echoed by Daina Ramey Berry, who writes that, “I prefer to use the term ‘enslaved’ rather than ‘slave’ because it forces us to consider that bondpeople did not let anyone ‘own’ them. They were enslaved against their will.”67 More recently, such semantic choices have been championed by Baptist—who opts for “enslavers” rather than “slaveowner” or “slavemaster”68—and Gregory O’Malley, who writes in his Final Passages: The Intercolonial Slave Trade of British America, 1619-1807 (2014) that “the historian [has] little to work with in the quest for more humanizing descriptors. To avoid endless repetition of the commodified term slave, I will often refer to those carried in the slave trade as Africans or simply as people.”69 As above, somehow the word “slave” has become “nonhuman” and “commodified,” thereby implying an ontological status of nonbeing thrust upon captive Africans against their will. The repeated idiom of enslaved “commodification” has thus sneakily embedded itself into the language of scholarly inquiry. The implied conclusion of such lexical uneasiness is that these historical persons were not actually slaves at all: “Enslavers” mistook their captives for “slaves,” whose nonextinguishable humanity made the “inhuman” project impossible simply [End Page 40] by means of their continued existence. But are there really such damned connotations to the word “slave,” which surely **does not** describe an ontological status at all (unless one forces it to), and is there such emancipatory potential in the phrase “enslaved person?”70 These efforts at developing a new glossary for the study of slavery seem not just **convoluted** and self-gratifying but also profoundly **ahistorical**. They demonstrate how a mere semantic quip becomes the basis for normative posturing and a shallow attempt at reparative historiography. The way to a more lucid account of the history of enslavement is not by investing analytical or explanatory weight in synonyms, it is by being more precise about what we talk about when we talk about slavery.

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#### **Both the government and scholars have failed to incorporate Africana studies into policymaking. Unless theory is applied to government action, the worst inequalities will persist.**

Williams 9 (Zachary, Associate Professor of African American History at The University of Akron. His current research projects explore the religious history of African American men in the U.S., the evolution of black liberation theology in the modern black church, and the development of a distinctive African American policy history. He teaches courses on African American Policy History, African American Men’s History, American History 1877 to the Present, Sports in American History, and Urban America. AFRICANA CULTURES AND POLICY STUDIES, First published in 2009 by PALGRAVE, pg 45-27) KJS

While I was working as an intern at TransAfrica forum during the summer of 2004, I remember attending a lunch session where a young human rights lawyer discussed the plethora of problems in the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Her last major point was that no one would speak up because they did not want to sound like they did not want Africa to benefit from the bill. She rightly asserted that the words in the title of the bill, “growth and opportunity,” do not necessar- ily mean that—and if they did, for whom and at what cost? In July of 1999, the Association of Concerned African Scholars (ACAS) created a brief that specifically addressed their concerns with the legislation. In summary, the ACAS and a long list of other organizations were concerned about the long- term effects of the legislation because it imposed conditionalities that are all-too reminiscent of International Monetary Fund structural adjustment policies.68 In the spirit of the Africana studies, Jesse Jackson demanded a comprehensive pol- icy on Africa that specifically addressed the historical trend of domination and colonization and the racial themes that characterized those moves for the better part of the twentieth century.69 Despite efforts of black scholars and policy advo- cates to expand the parameters of the legislation to include historical and moral legacies of colonialism and racism, the AGOA was amended according to plan. While we can certainly say that some good has come from the legislation, what cultural and political costs will Africans pay for it?70 And what research method- ologies will we use to determine the impact and the desired affect of this policy? In the preceding cases, I established that in developing an informed policy- specific knowledge base for the African World, good intentions are clearly not good enough.71 Policies have very real consequences regardless of intention. Policymakers addressing the African Diaspora need to apply all the knowledge available and especially that of black studies specialists to effectively assess the formation and outcome of policy. Africans on the continent and in the Americas share a healthy criticism of the so-called democratic and color-blind policies of the West, and yet black studies scholars have spent a great deal of time debating the legitimacy of the field of Africana studies when their energies could have been better applied to the pragmatic discourse of effective policymaking. There is also much to be considered in how policy relationships continue to sustain notions of ethnic superiority and enforce cultural and political schemas of subordination.72 An overarching argument interlacing each of the discussions presented is that some of the most controversial and misapplied governmental policies regarding African Americans have developed without considering much of what the African Diaspora has to contribute to that discussion. In this manner, these policies have been developed as a law unto themselves. Lawmakers and pol- icy researchers have created rules of engagement for those who create the law without expending much thought on carefully integrating analyses of Africana studies scholarship into these pressing social and cultural issues. The result of a legislate-now-look-later approach to the African world has been devastating in consequence to both parties. Policymakers need to move beyond the inclusion of Africana studies scholar- ship in a novel way, to actively synthesizing its research in a manner that most benefits the communities it addresses. To do this, some of the burden must inevitably be placed on Africana scholars and Africana studies departments to (re)shift the emphasis from celebration of the political and cultural institutions of the African world to an engagement and analysis of the policies that affect them. Of course this argument is not entirely new but it is certainly timely. W. E. B. Du Bois realized that merely researching the plight of blacks was not enough. He was compelled to action when confronted with the reality of racial violence in Georgia upon seeing the body parts of a lynch victim prominently displayed at a grocery store.73 Perhaps some will interpret the tendency of government powerbrokers to make poorly or uninformed decisions regarding the African Diaspora as racist. As Bayard Rustin suggested in Moynihan’s case, this misunderstanding and mis- application of knowledge about the African Diaspora is not always racist but cer- tainly it stems from the architecture of racism in Western society.74 When expert analysis is consistently invoked for other geographical, gender, and cultural issues, but personal conviction or public opinion (or both) is the main determi- nant for policy concerning the African Diaspora, we must admit the presence of cognitive dissonance. Let us remember, the Moynihan report and the Johnson administration, as historians have looked back, were interested in addressing black issues through targeted policies aimed at eradicating discrimination and providing equal access to resources. The Reagan administration’s adoption of conservative egalitarian- ism ended this approach and cast a suspecting eye on programs that were not considered racially neutral. The Reagan administration made a disastrous mis- take by attempting to engage a culturally and historically distinguishable pop- ulation with a race-neutral approach. From that misstep we have learned that there can be no race-neutral policy in a race-plus society. Clinton learned that American attitudes toward Africa were based on racialized perceptions of blacks and violence. Public opinion is not formed in a racially or culturally neutral environment. Aside from these issues, a major problem common to all these scenarios is that Africana studies is not taken seriously as an academic discipline having meaningful contributions to make to public policy. In part, it is the discipline’s own fault for failing to press its relevance. Reagan used Russian specialists in his dealings with the Soviets and the State Department continues to do so in other regions of the world. Where does the Africana studies specialist fit in? The prob- lem of Africana policy will not be solved by Barack Obama’s election as president or through political appointments. In addressing policy issues, decision mak- ers and academics have an ethical responsibility to use the best research pos- sible before crafting a policy and that scholarship must democratically include those it seeks to assist. The best research available for the African Diaspora is not found in public opinion or personal conviction but in scholarship of the dis- cipline. To summarize black historian John Bracey on this issue, engineers go to college to learn to build and design; business students pursue a business degree to learn to improve the corporate sector; similarly, Africana studies was created to improve the life of those in the African World and to train its students to play a meaningful role in social change. The Africana Cultures and Policy Studies Institute believes that understand- ing and addressing socioeconomic inequalities in American society and through- out the world must go beyond reactionary impulses to episodic acts of racism to a thorough analysis and engagement of cultures, institutions, and policies. Until we are able to effectively create social change by engaging both culture and policy, Africana studies scholars are merely writing for themselves, and that mani- festation of ghetto oligarchy is an old rule of law worth breaking.

#### They say we meet, but they have no comparative definition of what it means to actualize a political strategy—when there is *no articulation* of what institutions they’re engaging with or even what specific changes they’re accomplishing in the broader world in the 1AC, you should presume negative. In order to “speak truth to power”, we need to learn how to engage with local policy and institutions. The 1AC made a *crucial mistake* when they refused to *name anyone outside of the debate sphere*

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In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.